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Small State Strategies in emerging Regional Governance Structures: Explaining the 
Danish advocacy for China’s inclusion in the Arctic Council  
 
Abstract 
This article departs from the puzzling observation that of the five littoral arctic states the 
Danish realm has been the most consistent backer in China’s quest to gain observer status 
in the Arctic Council. Small states are generally assumed to adapt to changes in the 
international system such as spatial re-configurations and alterations in the distribution of 
capabilities. Yet Denmark’s enabling role in relation to China seems to contravene that 
assumption. Why would a small state invite one of the world’s leading powers to enter its 
regional domain while its principle allies and regional partners – including USA and 
Canada - were still indecisive or outright hesitant? This article explores three possible 
explanations for the Danish support for China: 1) a domestic politics explanation 
featuring strategic use of discourse to entice Chinese investments in Arctic minera l 
extraction. 2) a securitisation explanation suggesting that unease with growing Canadian 
securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted courting China as a balancing act. 3) a foreign 
policy identity explanation focussing on the normative desire to enmeshment China into 
a liberal Arctic order.         
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In 2009 China applied to upgrade its ad hoc observer status (held since 2007) to regular 
observer state in the Arctic Council. This was not granted at the time, but in late 2011 
China renewed its bit – as a ‘near arctic state’ – for a formal position in the Arctic 
governance structure. Somewhat surprisingly the Arctic Council accommodated China’s 
wishes at their Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna in mid-May 2013 (for further discussion 
Willis & Depledge, 2015, p. 399-401). The upgrading of China’s status in the Arctic 
Council is of limited formal importance as it merely consolidates an already well-
established practice of China being invited to Council ministerial and working group 
meetings. Yet China’s wish for, and granting of, observer status is of great symbolic 
significance. This is evident by the active participation of high-level Chinese delegations 
in Council activities and in statements in and outside the Council urging the upgrading of 
its membership. The official state visits prior to China’s most recent application by the 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Iceland and Sweden and by President Hu Jintao 
to Denmark – the first state visit by a Chinese President in the country’s history – also all 
bear witness to the importance attached to the issue by China (see also Jacobson & Lee, 
2013). At the same time, an application on behalf of the European Union (EU), which 
had otherwise followed a comparable trajectory to that of China’s, was rejected: A 
rejection that – due to a turn of events - is not causally reversed given the strained 
relationship between the EU and Russia following the situation at the Crimea. Together 
this underline that decisions on allowing access to Artic governance is not taken light ly 
and institutional choices made in an emerging regional governance structure may well 
have lasting implications for power relations and political outcomes. 
This article departs from the puzzling observation that of the five littoral arctic states 
the Danish realm has been the most consistent backer in China’s quest to gain observer 
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status in the Arctic Council. Why did Copenhagen deem it to be in its interest to pro-
actively promote China’s stake in Arctic affairs? While minor and middle powers do at 
times exhibit diplomatic entrepreneurship, small states are generally assumed to adapt to 
changes in the international system such as spatial re-configurations and alterations in the 
distribution of capabilities (see Archer et al., 2014). Yet Denmark’s enabling role in 
relation to China’s quest for observer status in the Arctic Council seem to contravene that 
assumption. This begs the question: Why would a small state invite one of the world’s 
leading powers to enter its regional domain as the latter is no longer sheltered by a 
virtually inaccessible ice cap? Why would it do so while its principle allies and regional 
partners were still indecisive or outright hesitant?  
The article is organised as follows: the second section presents and theoretica lly 
grounds three explanations emphasising respectively: 1) a domestic politics explanation 
featuring strategic use of discourse to entice Chinese investments in Arctic minera l 
extraction. 2) a securitisation explanation suggesting that unease with growing Canadian 
securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted courting China as a balancing act. 3) a foreign 
policy identity explanation focussing on the normative desire to enmeshment China into 
a liberal Arctic order. The sections three, four and five investigating in turn the 
explanations empirically follow this. The sixth and final section concludes on the reasons 
for the unlikely Danish advocacy for China’s inclusion in arctic governance. But first we 
shall explore the immediate implications of China’s bid for the Danish Realm. 
 
China’s Arctic Bid and the Danish Realm 
Popular explanations for Denmark’s support for China’s Arctic Council bid have 
emphasised material gains as reflected in the coverage of major dailies (see Jørgenssen, 
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2011; Lü, 2012; Wamsler, 2012). China has won diplomatic favours through financial aid 
or investment in a number of instances around the globe. The recipients of aid or 
investment and grantors of favours have typically been economically precarious or 
vulnerable developing countries. By contrast Danish nominal GDP per capita is on par 
with that of Canada and USA, the balance of trade and the current account exhibit 
consistent and healthy surpluses, unemployment is modest, public debt manageable and 
top graded by S&P, Fitch and Moody’s with stable outlook (Danmarks Statistik, 2017). 
Additional increments of wealth accrued from granting China political favours are likely 
to be of marginal value for Denmark and have to be measured up against the potential 
cost of deviating from its traditional foreign policy position vis-á-vis traditional allies and 
partners such as the US and Canada (interview with former Ambassador of the Republic 
of Finland to the Arctic, 8 October 2016). 
 From the perspective of Greenland the potential rewards, however, may be 
significant. Not least in view of its substantial unexploited mineral riches. China has a 
proven track record in mineral extraction at sites considered inaccessible or otherwise 
risky and has leveraged various instruments such as development assistance to ensure 
required infrastructure roll-out to handle logistical challenges and ensure provision of 
utilities in remote locations. 
 The Danish realm includes Denmark, the North Atlantic Faroe Islands and 
Greenland. The two dominions have been granted Self-government in all issues save 
foreign and security policy. The distribution of the expected income from future resource 
extraction was negotiated between the Danish and Greenlandic governments and 
expressed in the agreement on Self-government made in 2009. On an annual basis, the 
first approximately US$13m (DKK75m) goes to Greenland; any income above this is 
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divided equally between the two governments, where the Danish share takes the form of 
a reduction of the yearly block grant to Greenland. This is currently approximate ly 
US$600m (approx. DKK 3.5 billion). Should the block grant be reduced to 0 then the 
agreement is to be re-negotiated (Law about Greenlandic Self-government, 2009).  
While the Danish and Greenlandic governments both hold out the prospect of gains 
from the agreement, it is clear that the expected income is of much more significance for 
the Greenlandic economy (see also Keil, 2013). The Greenlandic government must be 
expected to have a strong preference for exploiting this opportunity and attract 
international partners for this purpose. Yet the institutional constraints in having 
Copenhagen in charge of foreign and security policy means Greenland need to exert 
pressure on the Danish government in order to pursuit its interests’ vis-á-vis China. 
 
How can we explain the Danish advocacy for China’s inclusion in Arctic 
Governance?  
Our approach to exploring the Danish advocacy for China’s inclusion in arctic 
governance follows Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009) argument in favour of 
methodological pragmatism and analytical eclecticism when dealing with complex and 
novel research questions. The aim of our pragmatic approach is to enable the generation 
of systematic analytical insight into reasons for the Danish advocacy for China’s inclus ion 
in arctic governance. Our analytical eclectic version of pragmatism developed below will 
thus draw on a range of research traditions from comparative politics and Internationa l 
relations. International relation theory has traditionally separated the international system 
from domestic politics; the former being the object of analysis (Wendt, 1999, chapter 1). 
However, analysing the case at hand it is especially important to include a focus on 
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domestic politics. That is, a focus on the special nature of the Danish realm including in 
principle two separate governments with potentially very different geopolitical interests. 
The three different explanations we engage with are not necessarily competing, but 
nonetheless have their origin in different strands of literature. Using discursive 
institutionalism, the first explanation reflects popular depictions which have dominated 
press coverage of the issue in Denmark. The second explanation leans on Regiona l 
Security Complex theory which is uniquely positioned to zoom in on constitut ive 
dynamics of a region emerging from the receding icecap while enticing ‘penetrating 
external powers’. Finally, small state literature and constructivist foreign policy analysis 
emphasise small states reliance on, and enthusiasm for multilateral, governance 
mechanisms while also appreciating that the entailed normative package may impact 
behaviour to an extent that challenge what a more confined rationalist calculus would 
stipulate as being in a given small states ‘national interest’. Hence the puzzling 
observation that Denmark seemingly failed to align its position with more cautious key 
allies may be accounted for by ‘normative capture’. 
    
The domestic politics explanation 
The domestic politics explanation puts a spotlight on the relation between Denmark and 
Greenland within the Danish realm. Greenlandic political pressure can here be viewed as 
a potential determinant of Danish Arctic policy. This perspective takes its cue from the 
literature on discursive institutionalism (Lynggaard, 2012; Schmidt, 2008). The 
discursive institutional perspective offers the conceptual means to understand how the 
Greenlandic government may exercise pressure on the Danish government, even under 
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the condition of the hierarchical relationship between the Danish and Greenland ic 
government on foreign policy issues. 
Discursive institutional theory accentuates that actors are guided by discourse setting 
out a ‘space of possibility’ for viable political activity. Political actors most often operate 
without much further reflection according to a set of internalised discourses. However, 
sometimes actors may also use discourses strategically to bring about or, indeed, hinder 
certain policy goals (Lynggaard, 2013). To understand the discourses guiding the 
relationship between central Danish and Greenlandic governments, we need to look to 
the discursive constitution of the Danish realm. It has been suggested that the Danish 
realm discourse is characterised by two apparent paradoxes: (i) that the end goal of the 
Realm is its own dissolution and (ii) that it is made up by equal partners, even though it 
is clearly a hierarchical relation, historically and present (Gad, 2008). Our central claim 
is here that the paradoxical nature of the Danish realm discourse is especially fit for 
strategic use: first the realm paradoxes work so as to explicate the discourse for the 
involved actors; second, it allows for, if not multiple, then a range of meanings to be 
attached to the political relationships in the Danish realm. Both are conditions conducive 
for Greenlandic strategic use of discourse to exert pressure on the Danish government to 
support further involvement of China in Arctic governance. 
 
The securitisation explanation  
The second explanation utilizes regional security complex (RSC) theory and suggests 
Denmark is enlisting China as a balancing act in response to growing Canadian 
securitisation of the Arctic region. Having the smallest military footprint of the five Arctic 
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littoral states, Denmark struggles to assert its sovereignty over Greenland includ ing 
disputed borders with Canada.  
Whereas Denmark has relied on Washington for its security in Europe, the Arctic 
RSC presents a different ball game. The US is likely indifferent with regards to the exact 
location of the Greenland-Canadian border, as a shift in either direction does not seriously 
alter the Arctic balance of power, moreover US is a regional hegemon in the North 
American continent and harbours a fundamental disdain towards extra regional players, 
thus producing a natural pro-Canadian bias also evident by the extensive collaboration 
through the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Denmark 
cannot turn to Russia as an Arctic ally since Russia poses the main existential threat to 
the European part of the Danish realm. This makes enlisting China as a balancing act a 
plausible option for Copenhagen. 
Denmark has a stated intention of preventing a militarisation of the Arctic. This is 
hardly surprising given that the country is a minor power in a region otherwise populated 
by major and great powers. Yet as a small power, Denmark’s possibility for decisive ly 
influencing the level of Arctic militarisation is limited. In this context prudent small state 
strategists need to plan for eventual intensified security rivalry and seek to expand its 
options in case demilitarization fails to carry the day. 
RSC theory including the concept of ‘Securitisation’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; 
Wæver, 1995) analyse security as a speech act, where the issue is not if threats are 
objectively present, but rather how a certain issue (troop movements, migration, or 
environmental degradation) can be socially constructed as a threat. The approach seeks 
to bridge constructivist and realist inspired IR and accordingly also takes material factors 
into account. The theory acknowledges neorealist traits such as polarity, balancing and 
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the need for great powers to possess certain capabilities. But in addition emphasise that 
great powers are defined by their behaviour. In security terms regions can be placed on a 
continuum on the basis of the prevalent patterns of interaction ranging from a traditiona l 
realist logic to a post-modern logic ((Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 32, p. 75). While 
regionally focussed extra-regional actors may be enticed to enter a specific RSC: 
 
The standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance-of power, and alliance 
patterns among the main powers within the region: to this pattern can then be added the 
effects of penetrating external powers. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 47) 
 
RSC theory crucially links material factors with discursive practices by stipulating that 
e.g. asymmetric capability distributions, the general operating mode of a given RSC, 
which could include involvement by extra-regional penetrating powers, impact if and how 
securitization unfold (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 86-87). What we propose is admittedly 
an elaborate string of arguments. The claim is that unease with growing Canadian 
securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted Denmark to court China as a balancing act. 
But in order for securitization to take hold, Denmark must respond in kind. Our 
investigation will therefore initially establish if rhetoric on Arctic issues in Ottawa and 
Copenhagen exhibit signs of securitization. Only if this can be established shall we 
endeavour to ascertain if Sino-Danish collusion may be designated an alliance.   
 
Foreign Policy Identity and normative agenda’s 
Our third explanation combines traditional ‘small state’ preference for multilateralisa t ion 
with the Foreign Policy Identity literature which emanates from constructivism. Identity 
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can broadly be defined as “images of individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) held 
and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with 
significant ‘others’” (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 59). In its discursive connotation, identity 
is concerned with the justification of foreign policy rather than its causation (Hansen, 
2002, p. 8). As such it is considered the deepest discursive layer providing the foundation 
of argumentative legitimations of foreign policy. 
 Stahl et. al. (2004, p. 426-27) depicts a post-World War II Danish foreign policy 
identity which breaks with its previous path of isolationism and neutrality only to find 
itself captured between two co-existing discourses exposing a ‘preference for Nordic 
cooperation’ and ‘an openness to multilateral collaboration’. The Arctic Council offers 
an ideal acid test for this diagnosis since it promise a venue of multilateral collaborating 
which can be grounded in Nordic cooperation. 
As a founding member of the UN and all major ‘Western’ regimes, Denmark’s 
consistent aspiration to strengthen the formalisation and institutionalisation of 
international relations is well documented (Branner & Kelstrup, 2000; Schouenborg, 
2012). This behaviour is consistent with small state theory (Katzenstein, 1985; Toje, 
2010) and can be seen to reflect an example of the ‘creative agency’ of ‘Small State 
Diplomacy’ (Bishop, 2012, p. 950-51). In this vein, Copenhagen deems Chinese 
engagement in the Arctic inevitable and thus seeks to enmesh the country in a budding 
regional governance structure. Elevating China to a stakeholder may ensure compliance 
from state backed mining groups vis-a-vis environmental and labour standards. 
Small state behaviour typically conforms to either patterns of adaptation or activism. 
With the demise of the Soviet threat and the end of bipolarity, Denmark replaced 
adaptation with activism (Pedersen, 2012, p. 333). Danish foreign policy activism has 
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been associated with ‘internationalism’ and ‘multilateralism’ entailing an increase in 
Denmark’s engagement in international organizations and alliances (Holm, 1997). This 
activist path is fuelled by aspirations to ‘promote liberal ideas and impose liberal values 
regionally and globally’ and entails ‘a strong defence of an international order, rule of 
international law and reinforcement of the role of international organizations in the 
international system’ (Pedersen, 2012, p. 332). Our claim is then: Extending the liberal 
order and embedding regional manifestations of the order by explicitly enlisting the most 
prominently rising power would seem a meaningful course of action for a small state like 
Denmark. 
Below we shall examine each of the three proposed explanations in turn. Our 
analytical strategy is based on the triangulation of data and methods, where our key 
analytical points are based on at least two sources (typically more) and, if at all possible, 
two types of methods. For this investigation we use document analysis, interviews and 
existing empirical studies. Documents for the analysis such as Arctic strategies and 
government report have been selected so to capture positions of governments or 
governmental units. Relevant national law, international law and declarations have been 
conferred so to capture – legally or politically – sanctioned behaviour among the 
involved. Additional independent reports have been conferred so to contextualise the 
former. Media reports reflect public debate, but also different party positions. The 
sensitivity and current nature of the topic rendered traditional interviewing difficult and 
is probably also important reasons for an additional number of planed interviews not 
materialising. Yet, nine in-depth off-the-record interviews and additional three less 
formalised ‘personal communications’ have been conducted in Nuuk, Copenhagen, 
Bruxelles, Washington and Reykjavik with centrally placed politicians and administra t ive 
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personnel directly involved in case at hand. Respondents represented the political strata, 
diplomacy and the military command. The interviews and communications were all 
conducted with two interviewers present allowing for intensive note making and varied 
in length between approximately half an hour and two hours. Most respondents asked for 
full or some degree of anonymity. To be sure, in some instances it has not been possible 
to triangulate, sometimes unique, insights obtained through interviews. Essentially the 
sometimes narrow timeframes for an elite interview directed us at first pursuing distinct 
insights from the respondent and second, if time allowed it, pursing perspectives on points 
obtained in preceding interviews or from other types of sources. Our analysis is sensitive 
to these concerns.   
 
Greenlandic political pressure as determinant of Danish Arctic policy? 
Especially two events have offered the opportunity for Greenlandic strategic use of 
discourse to put pressure on the Danish government to support the Chinese quest for 
formal affiliation with the Arctic Council: (1) the Danish chairmanship of the Arctic 
Council 2009-2011 and (2) the elaboration and implementation of the Danish realm 
Arctic Strategy 2011-2020. 
Although Greenland (and the Faroe islands) is formally represented through the 
Danish government in the Arctic Council, the chairmanship was both presented and 
practiced as a close collaboration with the Greenlandic government. The Danish realm 
chairmanship 2009-2011 thus offered a significant opportunity for Greenland to promote 
an agenda for the Arctic vis-à-vis Denmark and internationally. The agenda set by the 
Danish chair did in fact encourage a broader consideration of the status of ad hoc members 
in the Council and states:  
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The increased international focus on Arctic issues has...inspired many other non-
Arctic states and organisations to seek closer ties with the Council. Observers and 
ad hoc observers are assets, and the Arctic Council should look for ways to further 
involve those that are ready to cooperate under the premise that the primary role of 
the Arctic Council is to promote sustainable development for the Peoples of the 
Arctic and the Arctic States (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009, p. 8). 
 
In spite of having agreed on an informal ‘umbrella programme’ in 2006 with the 
preceding Norwegian (2006-2008) and subsequent Swedish (2011-2013) chairmanships, 
the call for further involvement of Arctic Council observers was unique to the Danish 
efforts (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006; Swedish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 2011). Greenlandic officials were certainly aware of the opportunity to influence 
the Council agenda through the Danish realm chairmanship. Yet if there were any 
pressure from Greenland to open up the possibility for a closer involvement of the 
Chinese, it was in a much more indirect way. Greenland was particularly keen to push an 
emphasis on the economic and social conditions for the arctic populations in the 
preparation of, and during, the chairmanship, rather than the otherwise one-sided and 
traditional focus of the Arctic Council on natural preservation and environmental matters. 
This is evident in annual Foreign Policy Strategy and Reports (Government of Greenland, 
2010, 2011) and expressed here – not without irony - by then Prime Minister of Greenland 
(Kuupik Kleist) at the Council Ministerial meeting in 2011 marking the end of the Danish 
realm chairmanship: ‘[The] Arctic is not just about polar bears and ice. What is often 
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missing from the debate is the human dimension in the Arctic and conditions under which 
we live’ (Kuupik Kleist, 12 May 2011, own translation).   
While the Greenlandic government is eager to promote an agenda of real economic 
development including Chinese investments, the prime minister also made it clear that: 
’They [Chinese investors] must not believe that they can make decisions on behalf of the 
local population and exploit resources freely in the arctic area, which are regulated by 
law, treaties, and binding agreements’ (Kuupik Kleist, 3 November 2011, own 
translation).  
Like the Council chairmanship, the Arctic Strategy was presented as a joint project 
by the Danish realm. The need for a common strategy for the Arctic was agreed between 
Denmark and Greenland in September 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 
2010), and the ‘Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011– 2020’ was published 
less than a year later. The strategy among others states that:  
 
Beyond the Arctic states, other legitimate stakeholders also have increasing interests 
in the Arctic. These interests are particularly linked to research on climate change, 
new international transportation opportunities, as well as opportunities to profit 
from the exploitation of energy and mineral resources in the Arctic. Among these 
stakeholders is the EU, but also the three Northeast Asian countries, China, Japan 
and South Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2011, p. 54). 
 
While the strategy set out a wide range of objectives and strategies, the backing of China 
in their quest for a formal status in the Council attracted special attention internationa l ly. 
Yet, on the domestic political scene the strategy was backed by a broad politica l 
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consensus. The Arctic Strategy was thus elaborated during the period a conservative 
minister (Lene Espersen) was heading the foreign office, representing a centre-right 
coalition government with the liberal party (Venstre). The centre-left coalition 
government taking office less than a month after the publication of the Arctic Strategy 
did not alter Denmark’s support for China, which was endorsed on several occasions by 
the new Foreign Minister (Villy Søvndal), leader of the most left wing party in the 
coalition (Berlingske Tidende, 2011). 
  In Greenland, attracting foreign investments including Chinese has clearly been 
linked to the objective of ‘economic self-sustainability’, which is seen as possibly the 
most important condition for seeking full independence from Denmark. Furthermore, 
according to the then Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist, the Self-government had very keenly 
been pushing for the Danish government to develop an explicit arctic strategy so as ‘to 
catch up with the other states in the arctic council´ (interview with Kuupik Kleist, 29 
May 2013). Yet, the extent to which attracting Chinese investments informed the Danish 
position such ‘shopkeeper’ considerations seemed to be more of a concern for the Danish 
side (interview with Kuupik Kleist, 29 May 2013). Personal communication with a 
centrally placed Greenlandic politician and a civil servant in the Self-government further 
confirms that the position on China’s observer status was equally backed by the 
Greenlandic and different Danish governments (Interview with civil servant in the 
Greenlandic Self-government, 21 February 2013; personal communication with 
Greenlandic politician, 21 February 2013). In sum the Greenlandic government does not 
appear to have made strategic use of the Danish realm discourse to pressure the Danish 
government for a favourable position on China’s request for a formal position in the 
Arctic Council. Rather, the Greenlandic and Danish governments have been in alignment 
 
17 
 
with a strategy towards the Arctic which includes working for a closer association of 
China in Arctic governance. This is a condition conducive to the Danish position, yet not 
a sufficient explanation of it.   
 
Enlisting China as a balancing act 
A militarization of the Arctic is favoured by no one (Heininen, 2010). Yet, in spite of 
ongoing extensive Arctic bilateral collaboration between Copenhagen and Ottawa, a 
number of events suggest a securitisation of Danish-Canadian Arctic encounters has taken 
place. Since the close of the Cold War, rivalry over disputed borders have picked up. 
Sovereignty over ‘Hans Island’ has spurred successive expeditions in what the 
international press dubbed the ‘Flag War’ entailing ‘dispatching their navies to invade 
the uninhabited island to tear each other's flag down’ (People’s Daily, 2005). It 
culminated in 2005, when the Canadian minister of defence landed on the Island, removed 
the Danish flag and raised the Canadian flag. This eventually prompted the two country’s 
foreign ministers to meet at a UN General Assembly session the same year agreeing to 
defuse the conflict (CBCNews, 2005; Stevenson, 2007, p. 163).   
Following the defusing of the ‘Flag War’, Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party won 
Canadian national elections in 2006. This boosted the political attention devoted to Arctic 
issues and heralded a more assertive nationalist rhetoric on the subject. In a speech 
delivered in June 2007, Harper declared: 
 
The on-going discovery of the North’s resource riches – coupled with the potential 
impact of climate change – has made the region an area of growing interest and 
concern. Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the 
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Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake; this Government intends to 
use it (Harper, 2007). 
 
The above statement forms part of a pattern. Further evidence to that can be found in ‘The 
Speech from the Throne’, which opens every new session of Parliament and sets out the 
broad goals, directions and initiative of the government. In an analysis of two speeches 
delivered respectively in 2007 and 2010, Klaus Dodds writes: ‘Harper has affirmed time 
and time again three major themes: the pressing importance of Canadian sovereignty, 
the economic value of the Arctic, and the symbolic significance of the north to Canadian 
national identity’ (Dodds, 2011, p. 371). 
In the realm of defence, the issue of Arctic sovereignty was addressed in a substantia l 
section of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, which states: 
 
The government recognizes the challenges Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic could 
face in the future. In the coming years, sovereignty and security challenges will 
become more pressing as the impact of climate change leads to enhanced activity 
throughout the region. The defence of Canada’s sovereignty and the protection of 
territorial integrity in the Arctic remains a top priority for the government (Harper, 
2008). 
 
This observation led to a commitment for ‘A Stronger Northern Presence’ (Harper, 2008) 
and in 2010, the Canadian foreign ministry issued its Arctic Foreign Policy Statement, 
which is subtitled: ‘Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s NORTHERN 
STRATEGY Abroad’. The 29-page document contains three sections the first of which 
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is presented under the headline ‘Exercising Sovereignty’. This section sets out three 
priorities the first of which is resolving border issues. In direct references to relations with 
the Kingdom of Denmark it is stated: 
 
Our sovereignty over Canadian Arctic lands, including islands, is undisputed—with 
the single exception of Hans Island, a 1.3-square-kilometre Canadian island which 
Denmark claims…Canada controls all maritime navigation in its waters. 
Nevertheless, disagreements exist…between Canada and Denmark over a small part 
of the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea (Cannon, 2010, p. 6-7). 
 
In parallel to the above, which does lean towards securitization, the document makes 
several conciliatory statements such as: ‘All disagreements are well managed, neither 
posing defence challenges for Canada nor diminishing Canada’s ability to collaborate 
and cooperate with its Arctic neighbours’ (Cannon, 2010, p. 7). 
Events seem to back up Canada’s more assuaging posture as the ‘Tentative 
Agreement’ on Lincoln Sea Boundary was reached between Canada and the Kingdom of 
Denmark on 28 November 2012. This agreement settled a dispute over a 65 square 
nautical miles area (Baird, 2012). There are, however, limits to Canada’s willingness to 
extending security cooperation mechanisms to the Arctic. According to a leaked US cable 
‘PM Harper cautioned SecGen Rasmussen [also former Danish Prime Minister 2001-
2009] that he saw no NATO role in the Arctic’ (US Embassy in Ottawa, 2010). A senior 
Danish military commander interpreted this as a reflection of Canada’s self-perception of 
being a leading Arctic military power. Involving NATO would diminish her lead and 
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curtail her autonomy of action in the domain of Arctic security (interview with Danish 
civil servant, 19 February 2013). 
Danish political rhetoric has been somewhat less explicit. Executive proclamations 
on Arctic sovereignty are rare and in the few recorded occasions they appear understated. 
Hence in 2009, the then Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller remarked in a London 
speech ‘we will soon have to discuss and decide: who owns the North Pole. That, by the 
way, I think we do’ (Petersen, 2009, p. 54).  
Furthermore, like its Canadian counterpart the first section of the Danish realm Arctic 
Strategy addressed security issues under the headline: ‘A Peaceful, Secure and Safe 
Arctic’. It contains three subsections of which the first two are titled ‘Basis for peaceful 
cooperation with emphasis on the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea’ and 
‘Enhanced maritime safety’. The last subsection went under the heading ‘Exercising of 
sovereignty and surveillance’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2011, p. 13-22). 
Provided the order reflects a list of priority, the sequence significantly deviates from the 
Canadian document possibly reflecting the comparatively weaker military position of the 
Kingdom in the region. The section contains no reference to Canada, Hans Island or 
disputed borders but emphasise the need for increased surveillance and collaboration with 
Arctic and NATO partners. 
In the military sphere, senior officers and analysts have produced several official and 
semi-official documents that approach the issue in a blunter manner. Rear Admiral Niels 
Wang of the Royal Danish Navy has pointed to what he denotes as the fragile state of the 
Arctic balance of power which will likely tip if external actors sense Denmark and 
Greenland are parting ways (Langhoff, 2012; Wang, 2012). It essentially makes a case 
for Greenland remaining in the Realm, which is hardly a surprising point of view for a 
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member of the defence establishment. However, it also reveals a distinct line of thinking 
which assumes states are power maximizing entities and peace is best served by 
maintaining a balance of power, much in line with realist dogma. 
Three scenarios for capability planning towards 2025 are presented in the Danish 
Defence Ministry’s think tank publication mentioned above. The first is titled the Coast 
Guard scenario and depicts a politically benign context. The second is called the Crises 
Management scenario, which assumes that no permanent militarisation of the region has 
taken place; nevertheless, the Arctic powers are in a state of latent rivalry, which on 
occasion may spill into a crisis. The final scenario is dubbed the Confrontation scenario 
with permanent militarization of the region and intense global rivalry between the US and 
China (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012). The report warns that preparing for the ‘worst 
case’ Confrontation scenario may produce a self-fulfilling prophesy due to the 
mechanisms of the security dilemma (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012, p. 62). It rates 
the likelihood of the three scenarios and ranks the benign Coast Guard outcome as the 
most plausible sharply followed by the Crises Management outcome. It considers the 
Confrontation scenario as fairly unlikely.  
Yet, the report cautions that planning exclusively for the Coast Guard scenario may 
signal lacking commitment on the part of Denmark to uphold sovereignty in the other 
Arctic states. It falls short of outright directing policy makers towards the Crises 
Management scenario but notes that its capability requirements are fairly close to those 
of the Coast Guard scenario with the addition that deployed naval vessels are easily 
reconfigured in the face of escalating crises. 
In sum, rhetoric’s paving the way for a securitisation of the Arctic can be recorded 
in Canada. Given geographic and size differences it is hardly surprising that Canadian 
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rhetoric is more blunt and assertive and is more inclined to directly address Denmark. 
Denmark, on the other hand, exhibits a more subdued posture and avoids pitting Arctic 
security issues in a manner suggesting rivalry and neither policy documents, be they 
official or semi-official, nor political speeches link acts of Arctic securitisation with 
China’s affiliation to the Arctic Council. Moreover, none of the policy makers 
interviewed for this article pointed to a link between Denmark’s support for China’s 
application and balancing concerns – on the contrary several strongly dismissed the idea. 
In this light the failure to establish an empirical case for securitisation on the one hand 
and Denmark’s advocacy of China on the other warrant a rejection of the second 
explanation. 
 
Making China a responsible stakeholder in Arctic governance 
Being a responsible international actor and a promoter of a normative agenda conform 
neatly with Denmark’s self-perception. Yet Copenhagen has attracted substantia l 
criticism for what its detractors claim is the country’s attempt to undermine the Arctic 
Council. Criticism has been put forth by NGOs representing indigenous people and 
environmental groups in addition to fellow Arctic Council member states such as Iceland, 
Sweden and Finland (interview with European Commission civil servant, 17 October 
2014; Former Ambassador of the Republic of Finland to the Arctic, 8 October 2016; US 
civil servant, 2 March 2015; see also Dodds, 2013, p. 121-22; Koivurova & Duyck, 2010, 
p. 186). The critique particularly concern Denmark’s leading role in convening the 
secluded purely intergovernmental ad hoc group designated the Arctic Five. 
In late May 2008 the circumpolar states comprising Canada, United States, Russia, 
Norway and Denmark gathered at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Western Greenland. 
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Co-hosts, Denmark’s Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller and Greenlandic Prime Minister 
Hans Enoksen had prepared a document, which after minor alterations was adopted as the 
Ilulissat Declaration (Petersen, 2009). It established that the five states would settle 
maritime zones disputes peacefully adhering to the principals of and utilizing the 
mechanism spelled out by the law of the sea. No explicit reference is made to the more 
detailed provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
as it has not been signed by the United States. It furthermore stated that existing 
international institutions were adequate to provide the five states with means for 
collaboratively addressing the challenges that increased resource extraction and shipping 
would produce in view of growing accessibility due to global warming. 
Denmark’s lead in convening the Arctic Five may be interpreted as an attempt to 
demonstrate continued allegiance to the existing hierarchy of global powers and the 
privileged position of sovereign states in international relations. In addition, the second 
aspect covered by the Ilulissat Declaration does little to reinforce Denmark’s credentials 
as advocating a stronger role for international organisations in the international system. 
Hence, the proclamation that existing international law and institutions provide an 
adequate framework for the circumpolar states to manage the Arctic was aimed at calls 
by NGOs to establish a dedicated Arctic treaty framework possibly including a 
moratorium on territorial claims and mineral extraction (for an overview of proposals in 
circulation see Koivurova, 2008). Thus Denmark’s behaviour in relation to the Arctic 
Five initiative does not initially suggest that the Danish position is informed by a general 
desire to strengthen and expand multilateral governance. As to the depiction of 
Denmark’s foreign policy identity by Stahl et. al., the exclusion of three Nordic states is 
particularly noteworthy. 
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Yet the Ilulissat Declaration bears testimony to the intent of enlisting multilatera l 
frameworks such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in addition to the 
regional Arctic Council. The latter subsequently facilitated the adoption of the first 
formalized and binding accord since its inception in 1996 with the Arctic Search and 
Rescue Agreement of 2011. A major enabler was the modus operandi relating to marit ime 
zones disputes established by the Arctic Five which paved the way for the insertion of the 
following statement: ‘the delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and 
shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction’ (Arctic, 2011, p. 3). Hence a benign analysis of 
Denmark’s Arctic Five initiative could present it as a necessary move to boost the 
momentum of the Arctic Council. This by addressing the contagious issue of overlapping 
maritime zone claims, which is not a responsibility of the Arctic Council but nonetheless 
permeates state behaviour in said body, and anchoring conflict resolution in key 
multilateral mechanisms and established international law.  
This may be the enabling move that transform the Arctic Council into an effective 
tool of regional governance, which can safeguard the interests of post-independent 
Greenland. A Danish official in the field thus phrased the motivation for Danish support 
for China’s seat in terms of general support for inclusive and transparent internationa l 
governance (interview with Danish civil servant, 15 February 2013). By implicat ion, 
Denmark supported a range of applications for observer status including e.g. the request 
from South Korea. The Danish official further observed that the Council have few formal 
powers and often get absorbed in technical details, which in itself ensure that only actors 
with a serious interest devote the required resources to attend meetings. It was 
furthermore suggested that China’s interest in being attached to what was presented as a 
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rather impotent body, could largely be ascribed to prestige politics. Particularly since an 
observer seat does not amount to full stakeholder status and does not accord it 
significantly more privileges. This indicates that Denmark has little confidence in the 
governance capacity or indeed potential of the Arctic Council. The Council is presented 
as a forum of symbolic politics and Chinese interest is seen as driven by prestige 
considerations.  
A prominent observer of Danish Arctic policies, Martin Breum, suggests that 
Denmark’s eagerness to attach China to the Council is rooted in the fear that states outside 
of the region will use the UN to gain influence on Arctic governance (Breum, 2011, p. 
58). Yet in one of the interviews conducted by the authors it was stated that only NGO’s 
and social scientists had advocated a deeper UN involvement whereas this was not an 
issue among the present or prospective permanently attached states (interview with 
Danish civil servant, 13 February 2013). However, others suggested that concerns 
regarding the establishment of alternative fora including a special UN arrangement had 
been instrumental in changing the US attitude on the issue, which eventually enabled 
China to be admitted as an observer at the May 2013 Kiruna meeting (interview with 
Kuupik Kleist, 29 May 2013).  
In sum, the explanation conforms neatly to Denmark’s self-perceived diplomatic 
heritage, its small state identity and domestic political culture in general. While 
Denmark’s role in setting up the Arctic Five on the surface suggest the country has no 
ingrained preference for multilateral governance and some observations offered by senior 
officials reveals limited confidence in the Arctic Council’s potential as a potent future 
regional governance body which may entangle China into an ‘Arctic Order’, both the 
Arctic Five initiative and statements made by all interviewed officials suggest the country 
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in essence seek to embed intergovernmental liaisons in multilateral frameworks when 
possible. 
 
Conclusions: Assessing the relative strength of three explanations 
Three possible explanations were offered to make sense of Denmark’s proactive stance 
in aiding a rising power gaining a political foothold in a region where Copenhagen is in 
a vulnerable position as the receding icecap opens up for rivalry over resource access, 
shipping lanes and territory. It has proved difficult to sustain our first proposed 
explanation claiming that Denmark’s forthcoming approach to China’s application for an 
observer seat in the Arctic Council was the result of Greenlandic pressure. Yet the 
domestic politics perspective has some merits in that it is conducive to the Danish position 
that appears to be equally backed by the Greenlandic and different Danish governments 
in spite of the fact that Denmark risks estranging itself from its closest allies by adopting 
this stance. 
All interview respondents strongly dismissed the second explanation. This is to be 
expected, as members of the security policy community are keenly aware of the risks 
involved in conveying signals containing signs of either national weakness or aggressive 
pretentions. Yet, Denmark’s courting of China in the Arctic realm cannot reasonable be 
explained with reference to Canada’s adoption of highly securitised rhetoric as it is 
evident from our analysis of key government documents, independent reports and 
analyses that Denmark refrained from embracing similar semantics.  
Our third explanation suggests the Danish stance reflects genuine support for 
multilateral governance. Methodologically this claim contains some bias as all Danish 
and Greenlandic interview respondents immediately identified with the position. 
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However, it is a claim supported by several other interview respondents, independent 
analyses and it conforms neatly to the country’s self-perceived diplomatic heritage, its 
small state identity and domestic political culture in general. Thus, the Danish strategy fit 
well into its traditional foreign policy identity suggesting that small states are not just 
adapting to changes in the international system including spatial re-configurations and 
alterations in the distribution of capabilities, but may also adopt diplomatic strategies, if 
not against, then at least in the face of hesitant interest articulations of traditional allies.  
These findings call for further exploration of the conditions under which small states 
may adopt potentially estranging regional governance strategies. This article suggests that 
alignment of foreign policy identity and strategy is - unsurprisingly - conducive for small 
states ‘going alone’. Yet, arguably it is particularly significant that such strategy is 
adopted in the context of a less than institutionalised regional governance structure. 
Further insight to this is potentially of great importance, especially if we expect that 
institutional choices made in an emerging regional governance structure may well have 
lasting – and perhaps sometimes unintended – implications for power relations and 
political outcomes.             
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